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Abstract
Although standard incomplete market models can account for the magnitude of the
rise in consumption inequality over the life cycle, they generate unrealistically concave age
proles of consumption inequality and unrealistically less wealth inequality. In this paper, I
investigate the role of discount rate heterogeneity on consumption inequality in the context
of incomplete market life cycle models. The distribution of discount rates is estimated using
moments from the wealth distribution. I nd that the model with heterogeneous income
proles (HIP) and discount rate heterogeneity can successfully account for the empirical
age prole of consumption inequality, both in its magnitude and in its non-concave shape.
Generating realistic wealth inequality, this simulated model also highlights the importance
of ex ante heterogeneities as main sources of life time inequality.
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1 Introduction
A large and growing literature has emphasized the importance of consumption inequality1. On
the one hand, the usual roles of income and wealth are viewed as only means to consumption,
and therefore the consumption inequality is a more direct measure of welfare inequality; on
the other hand, consumption inequality, as an inverse measure of consumption insurance, can
provide us with valuable information of the market structure and individuals income processes.
In particular, the rise of life cycle consumption dispersion observed in the U.S. data has strong
implications for economics theories, as highlighted by Lucas (2003) in his American Economic
Association presidential address:
The fanning out over time of the earnings and consumption distributions within a cohort
that Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson (1994) document is striking evidence of a sizeable,
uninsurable random walk component in earnings.
Lucas statement is quantitatively veried by Storesletten et al. (2004) in a standard life
cycle incomplete market model; since then the life cycle prole of consumption dispersion
has become one of the crucial empirical targets in a variety of incomplete market models,
including Guvenen (2007) with Bayesian learning, Huggett et al. (2011) with human capital
accumulation, Kaplan (2012) with endogenous labour supply and Aguiar and Hurst (2012) with
multiple consumption goods. In general, all these incomplete market models have succeeded in
accounting for the rise in consumption inequality over the life cycle; and hence these models are
employed by their authors to answer, explicitly or implicitly, some important welfare questions.
However, there remain two unsatisfactory discrepancies between the incomplete market
models and the U.S. data:
1. These incomplete market models, except for Guvenen (2007)s model with learning,
generate consumption dispersion proles more concave than the data. To put it bluntly, they
have succeeded in matching the magnitude, but failed in matching the shape. This is a robust
feature of the quantitative life cycle incomplete market models, because in the model the old
agents consumption would response less to shocks when approaching retirement age, thanks
to the accumulation of savings for retirement.
2. These incomplete market models generate much less wealth inequality than the data.
This is a common feature of the standard incomplete market models2. Granted, wealth dis-
1Examples include: Deaton and Paxson (1994), Blundell and Preston (1998), Storesletten et al. (2004),
Krueger and Perri (2006), Guvenen (2007), Blundell, Preston and Pistaferri (2008).
2The incomplete market model can match the empirical wealth inequality by using non-standard income
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tribution per se is not the focus of these models and all model builders must keep a certain
degree of parsimony. Nevertheless, a models welfare implications regarding life cycle inequal-
ity would be seriously doubted, if the wealth inequality of the model agents were unrealistic
and systematically downward biased.
The aim of this paper is to x these two gaps. My conjecture is that these two gaps may
be interrelated, and in this paper I explore the possibility of bridging one gap with the other.
In particular, I relax the assumption of discount rate homogeneity in the standard incomplete
market models. In the context of calibrated quantitative incomplete market models, I estimate
the heterogeneous discount factors by matching the empirical moments in wealth distribution,
and then I investigate if this estimated model can account for the empirical consumption
inequality over the life cycle, in both the magnitude and the shape.
While the preference heterogeneity is well emphasized by applied microeconomists, the
macroeconomic model builders are still reluctant to relax the assumption of homogeneous pref-
erences, not because preference heterogeneity is not reasonable, but because it is unobservable.
Discount rate is usually elicited from some indirect evidence either by experiments designed to
reveal individuals preference (Barsky et al., 1997), or by Euler equation estimation (Lawrance
1991, Alan and Browning 2006, 2010) who measure the discount rate heterogeneity from the
unexplained Euler equation residuals. Following Krusell and Smith (1998), it is well-known
in the marcoeconomic literature that discount rate heterogeneity, though unobservable, can
potentially play an important role in wealth distribution. In the context of life cycle models,
discount rate heterogeneity is highlighted by Samwick (1998) for social security reforms, by
Hendricks (2007a) for the joint distribution of retirement wealth and earnings and by Hen-
dricks (2007b) for wealth inequality. However, the implication of discount rate heterogeneity
on consumption is still neglected. To the authors knowledge, this paper is the rst one to
investigate the role of discount rate heterogeneity on consumption inequality in an incomplete
market model. Perhaps the most related are two recent papers by Badel and Huggett (2012)
and Sun (2013) on consumption inequality, both in the context of complete market models.
I begin with the estimation of the distribution of the discount rates in an incomplete
market life cycle model. The additional moment I use is the fraction of old agents holding
zero or negative wealth, which cannot be explained by a standard homogeneous discount rate
life cycle model with realistic social security (Diamond and Housman 1984, Huggett 1996).
As consumption inequality is the focus of the paper, I estimate the distribution of discount
process (Castaneda et al. 2003) or by introducing the entrepreneur behavior and bequest motive (Cagetti and
De Nardi 2005).
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factors without taking any moments from the consumption data. To evaluate my estimates
from another dimension, I also compute the wealth Gini coe¢cient for the whole population,
for the retirement age people and for the coe¢cient of variance of the retirement wealth /
lifetime earnings ratio. Comparing with the data, the di¤erence is small. Interestingly, the
estimate in the benchmark model of this paper is 3.5%, which is almost the same as Hendricks
(2007a)s estimate, despite the fact that we use di¤erent targets in the wealth distribution.
Model implications with di¤erent assumptions of preferences and income processes are
compared. After a number of sensitivity analyses, I conclude that the quantitative models
with discount rate heterogeneity and heterogeneous income proles (HIP) can be successful
in matching the empirical age prole of consumption inequality and therefore can successfully
x these two above gaps. Without additional information or ad hoc model specication, it
is impossible for the econometricians to tell apart the predictable income change, such as the
heterogeneous income growth, from the unpredictable income change, such as the permanent
income shocks. The results of my model implies that the HIP model used by Lillard and Weiss
(1979), Hause (1980), Baker (1997), Guvenen (2007, 2009) and Primiceri and Rens (2009) is
consistent with the consumption data. Di¤erent from Gueven (2007), who resolves the puzzle
of the concave age prole of consumption inequality by introducing an unobservable Bayesian
learning parameter, I do not use any free parameter to match the consumption data. My model
is more parsimonious than Guvenen (2007) and it generates a more realistic wealth inequality.
Finally, I use the simulated model to revisit a welfare question which was addressed by
Keane and Wolpin (1997), Storesletten et al. (2004) and Huggett et al. (2012): which is more
important to the lifetime welfare, initial condition or lifetime risks? Storesletten (2004) argue
that ex post lifetime shocks are more important than initial conditions, while in the context of
a schooling choice model (Keane and Wolpin 1997) and a human captital accumulation model
(Huggett et al. 2011), the opposite is claimed to be true. I answer this question again in this
calibrated incomplete market model with realistic wealth inequality and consumption disper-
sion. I nd that the life-time inequality in welfare is mostly due to initial conditions. Among
those initial conditions, the discount rate heterogeneity is more important than heterogeneous
income proles, which is in turn more important than the xed e¤ect of income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the layout of the model
and calibrates the model without simulation. Section 3 estimates the distribution of discount
rates. Section 4 reports the results of consumption inequality over the life cycle. Section 5
studies the welfare implications of the model through comparing the relative importance of the
initial condition and lifetime risks. Section 6 concludes.
3
2 Model
2.1 The economy
The economy is populated by T overlapping generations, each of which consists of a continuum
of agents. Each agent is born (enters the labour market ) at age 1 and can live up to a maximum
of T periods. Agents face mortality risks. The probability of surviving between age t  1 and
age t is denoted by t, with 1 = 1 and T+1 = 0: The unconditional probability of being alive
at age t is st 
tQ
=1
 . The measure of the new born agents is denoted by 1 and the population
grows at a constant rate n, implying a stable population structure with t = 1st(1 + n)
1 t:
Agent is preference over consumption stream is given by
TP
t=1
t 1i stc
1 
i;t =(1  ); where i
is the individual time discount factor,  is the relative risk aversion and ci;t is the consumption
of agent i at age t. When each individual i is born, her discount factor i is drawn from a
distribution F () with mean  and variance 
2
. In the standard model where the discount
rate heterogeneity is absent, 2 = 0.
Agents enter the labour market at age 1 and the mandatory retirement age is tR. At
working age t < tR, the agents supply inelastically one unit of labour with di¤erent wages.
The exogenous labour income of agent i is
yi;t = (1  )wi;t; (1)
where  is the pension tax, wi;t is the wage income which is assumed to follow
logwi;t = w + t + i + 
it| {z }
predictable part
+ zi;t + "i;t| {z }
idiosyncratic shocks
; (2)
zi;t = zi;t 1 + i;t ,
The wage income can be decomposed into a predictable part and an idiosyncratic shocks
part. w is the average wage and t is the average age prole of income, which is identical to all
the agents of the same age. In the stationary equilibrium where there is only a cross-section
of overlapping generations, there is no time e¤ect and the concept of cohort and age coincide.
The next two terms are heterogeneous in agents: i is the xed e¤ect which is predetermined
before the agent enters the labour market, with the variance 2 ; i is the heterogeneity in the
growth rate of individual income, with the variance 2. This income process nests both the
Heterogeneous Income Prole (HIP) process where 2 > 0 and the Restricted Income Prole
(RIP) process where 2 = 0. The idiosyncratic shocks part consists of a persistent part zi;t
with zi;0 = 0, i;t  N(0; 
2
) and a transitory (i.i.d.) part "i;t with "i;t  N(0; 
2
"). The
persistent part becomes permanent when  = 1 or AR(1) when 0 <  < 1.
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After retirement, the agent i receives pension Bi;t, which is funded by a Pay-As-You-Go
system through the pension tax  . According to the U.S. Old Age pension system, the pension
is a concave function of lifetime average income. In computation, I will use the last period
non-transitory income as a proxy of the average income to mimic the U.S. pension system.
The market is incomplete in the sense that agents can only have access to a risk-free bond
which yields a constant interest rate r. The interest rate is set to be exogenous, but it is
straightforward to assume a production function to close the model. In that case, the interest
rate is a function of the parameters of aggregate capital and productivity. I use the standard
assumption that there exist perfect annuity markets for mortality risks, so that the return of
asset is the interest rate plus a survival premium. The agent is budget constraint is given by
ci;t + ai;t+1  ai;t(1 + r)=t + yi;t; (3)
where ai;t is the asset or nancial wealth. The agent cannot leave negative asset at year T
and faces a borrowing constraint ai;t+1  ai;t+1, where ai;t+1 is an ad hoc borrowing constraint
which can potentially be a function of current state variables and can be set as low as the
natural borrowing constraint. Each individual is endowed with initial wealth ai;0:
For CRRA utility function, we can obtain the balanced growth path by dividing all the
quantities by the accumulated productivity growth g: Given constant r and w; each agent is
decision problem can be written recursively as
Vi(; ; a; "; z; t) = max
a0

c1 =(1  ) + it+1(1 + g)
1 E[Vi(; ; a
0; "0; z0; t+ 1)jz]
	
(4)
subject to
c+ (1 + g)a0  a(1 + r)=t +

yi;t
Bi;t
t < tR
t  tR
a0  ai;t+1
aT+1  0
The terminal period value function is set to V (:;T +1) = 0: The equilibrium we study is a
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium where the factor prices are constant over time and
the age-wealth distribution is stationary. The decision rule is solved by backward induction
using Euler equation. To speed up the algorithm, I use the endogenous grid method developed
by Carrol (2006). I use linear interpolation with 71 grid points for positive asset and 50 grids
for negative asset. Grids on positive asset are formed triple exponentially to make more grids
where asset level is lower. I use two discrete states for each of the exogenous state variables
(; ; "; ). 50,000 agents are used in the simulation. In the unit root income process, I use
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41 state space for the permanent component. In the AR(1) income process, I discretise the
persistent shock by a 41 state Markov chain using the method suggested by Tauchen (1986).
2.2 Calibration
Demography The model period is 1 year. Agents begin to work at age 22, which coincides
with age 1 in the model. Conditional on surviving, they then work for 45 years, retire at age
66 and die at age 100. Agents are interpreted as households in the data, and hence we chose
the conditional surviving rate from the U.S. life table for females in 1989-1991. The annual
population growth rate is set to n = 1:0% per year. The interest rate r is set exogenously to
be 4%.
Preference The risk aversion is set to  = 2. For the estimation of the distribution of ,
I will leave it to the next section.
Income process: RIP Vs HIP So far, it is still an open question whether the restricted
income proles (RIP) or the heterogeneous income proles (HIP) can better represent the
households income process in economic research3. I will not take a stand at this moment
and use both RIP and HIP as the income process. In the RIP model, I use Storesletten et
al. (2004) s estimation. The coe¢cient of auto-regression  is very close to 1, which is 0:98.
I set it to 1 in computation as Storesletten et al. (2004) did, and therefore the persistent
shock is actually permanent. The variance of the xed e¤ect, persistent shock, transitory
shocks are 2 = 0:2105; 
2
 = 0:0161; 
2
" = 0:0630, respectively. In the HIP model, I use the
income process estimated by Guvenen (2007, 2009). The variance of the wage growth rate is
2 = 0:00038. The correlation coe¢cient between the idiosyncratic part of wage growth and
the xed e¤ect is cov(; ) =  0:002. The variance of the xed e¤ect, persistent shock and
transitory shock are 2 = 0:022; 
2
 = 0:029; 
2
" = 0:047;respectively. Unlike Guvenen (2007)s
learning story, I assume there is no prior uncertainty about the income process and thus the
agent has complete information of her income prole when she enters the labour market.
The secular productivity growth rate is set to g = 1:5% per year. The average age prole
of income t is chosen to match the average income in the U.S. Census 1990.
Pension The pension system in the benchmark model is designed to mimic the U.S. Old
Age pension system as follows:
3See Guvenen (2009) for a summary.
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Bi = 
8>><
>>:
0:9yi;p;R 1
0:27yp;R 1 + 0:32(yi;p;R 1   0:3yp;R 1)
0:81yp;R 1 + 0:15(yi;p;R 1   2yp;R 1)
1:1yp;R 1
for yi;p;R 1 < 0:3yp;R 1
for yi;p;R 1 2 (0:3yp;R 1; 2yp;R 1]
for yi;p;R 1 2 (2yp;R 1; 4:1yp;R 1]
for yi;p;R 1 > 4:1yp;R 1
where yi;p;R 1 denotes the last working year income excluding the transitory part and yp;R 1
denotes the average. I use this income instead of the lifetime average income for computational
convenience. Guvenen (2007) uses a similar expression where the last period income serves
as the proxy for the average lifetime income. I exclude the transitory part because the last
period transitory part gives us little information of the average life cycle income and the non-
transitory part is still highly correlated with average life cycle income. I rescale the pension
system to make the replacement ratio of the model match that of the U.S. data, which is 0.48.
It generates 0.92 in the benchmark RIP model and 0.82 in the HIP model. The pension tax 
can be solved directly by the PAYG system, which is 0.1325. I will also discuss the extreme
case when there is no pension.
Borrowing constraint In the benchmark setup for both RIP and HIP models, the house-
holds are allowed to borrow up to the expected income of next year ai;t+1 =  Et(yi;t+1), which
is the same as used in Storesletten et al. (2004). I also consider two other extreme cases: one
is that all households are excluded from any borrowing, i.e. a = 0; the other is that no ad
hoc borrowing constraints is imposed and I only impose the terminal condition that agents
cannot die in debt at age T + 1. In other words, I set the borrowing constraint as low as the
natural borrowing constraint which is not binding in households optimal solution with CRRA
preference.
Initial wealth The initial wealth distribution is calibrated to mimic the wealth distribution
of households under age 25 in SCF 1992 (Diaz-Gimenez et. al 1997). I approximate the
initial wealth distribution by a log normal distribution whose mean is set to match the initial
wealth/income ratio, which is 0.89, and then I calibrate its variance to match the wealth Gini
for those young households, which is 0.87.
The above parameters for calibration are partly summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1: Parameters in Benchmark Models
Parameter Value
Relative Risk Aversion  = 2
Mortality Risk U.S. Female Life table 1991
Interest Rate R = 1:04
Population Growth n = 1%
Secular Growth g = 1:5%
Average Wage Growth U.S. Census 1990
Restricted Income Process  = 1; 2 = 0:2105; 
2
 = 0:0161; 
2
" = 0:0630
Heterogeneous Income Process  = 0:821; 2 = 0:022; 
2
 = 0:029; 
2
" = 0:047
2 = 0:00038, cov(; ) =  0:002
Pension Tax in PAYG  = 0:1325
Borrowing Constraints ai;t+1 =  Etyi;t+1
3 Estimation of F ()
3.1 Methodology
The distribution of i is crucial in the model. In a standard model without discount rate
heterogeneity, the variance of i is restricted to be zero and the conventional procedure of
calibrating  is to minimize the distance between the wealth/income ratio in the simulated
model and that of the data. In the model with discount rate heterogeneity, however, we need
additional moments to identify the distribution of i.
The estimation strategy I use is in the spirit of Hendricks (2007a). Besides the normal target
of wealth/income, I focus on one particular statistics of the wealth distribution: the fraction
of old agents holding zero or negative wealth. Because of the life cycle motive of saving, the
standard life cycle models have di¢culty in generating signicant amount of agents with zero
or negative wealth when retirement is approaching, which is at odds with the data (Diamond
and Housman 1984)4. This model discrepancy with the data implies that there might be a
signicant amount of su¢ciently impatient agent. Hence, it gives us useful information in
calibrating the distribution of i. Specically, I choose the fraction of agents holding zero or
negative wealth from age 55 to 64 as another target for calibration. In the U.S. data from SCF
1992, this number is 8.9% (Weicher 1997)5. My estimation strategy is simpler than that of
Hendricks (2007a), who targets the whole age prole of wealth Gini coe¢cient. I will compare
4Huggett (1996)s incomplete market model can match this fraction, but his results hinge on the existence of
a unrealistically generous lump-sum pension and loose borrowing constraints. Hubbard et al. (1995) argue that
this puzzle can be resolved by introducing the asset-based means-tested social insurance system, but it seems
not plausible to assume that the main reason why the old households hold non-positive wealth is to get qualied
for government transfers.
5Diamond and Hausman (1984) calculate the fraction of individuals holding zero or negative wealth in a
sample of men aged 45-59. Their result is 7%.
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my results with his for a robust check.
I approximate the distribution of discount factor F () by a discrete distribution with two
values l = (1 ) and h = (1 + ). The probability of being an relatively impatient
agent is pl, and the probability of being a relatively patient household is ph = 1   pl. The
middle value of the discount rate, , is assumed to be equal to the calibrated value of  in a
standard model without discount rate heterogeneity to match the wealth income ratio in the
U.S. of 3.1 from SCF 1992 (Diaz-Gimenez et al. 1997). Alternatively, I will also consider the
wealth/income ratio of 4.56, which is the average of SCF 1992 and SCF 1998 (Diaz-Gimenez
et al. 2002). The two targets for estimating  and pl are the wealth income ratio again and
the average fraction of non-positive wealth household from age 55 to age 64. To save the time
for computation,  is assumed to lie on 30 grids, from 0.005 to 0.15, and pl is assumed to
lie on 100 grids, from 1% to 99%.  and pl are chosen to minimize the loss function which
is the sum of the absolute value of the percentage deviation between data and model in these
two targets.
3.2 Estimation results
The estimations of i are summarized in Table 2. I compute the mean and standard deviation
of i, which are di¤erent, though not far, from  and . The estimation results will be
discussed in the next section.
Table 2: Estimation of Distribution of Discount Rate
RIP Model HIP Model
  pl   pl
Benchmark 0.9870 0.030 64% 0.9972 0.035 66%
No pension 0.9559 0.085 81% 0.9566 0.080 78%
No borrowing 0.9878 0.090 81% 0.9947 0.095 84%
NBC 0.9918 0.020 56% 1.0120 0.015 55%
High Wealth 1.0035 0.045 62% 1.0133 0.050 68%
Alan and Browning (2006) 0.9359 0.087 50% 0.9447 0.087 50%
Hendricks(2007a) 0.9873 0.035 61% 0.9955 0.035 61%
The result shows that  and pl varies in di¤erent model setups. In the benckmark RIP
and HIP models,  is 0.03 and 0.035, respectively. In general, the estimates for RIP models
is close to those for the HIP models. The middle value of discount factors, , is higher in
HIP models than in RIP models, because a less persistent shock reduces the precautionary
motive for saving and thus lowers the wealth income ratio. To match the wealth income
ratio,  has to be increased. When there is no pension or when there is no borrowing, the
standard models without discount rate heterogeneity generate too few old agents holding zero
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or negative wealth. Increasing both the fraction and the value of relatively impatient agents
helps to match this moment. pl is greater than 50% in all estimation, because discount rate
heterogeneity will increase the mean wealth of the economy. To make  unaltered, the fraction
of impatient agents has to be increased.
For comparison, I also report the estimates of mean and variance of i from the estimation
of Hendricks (2007a) and Alan and Browning (2006)6. Simple as it is, my estimation of
distribution of i in both RIP and HIP benchmark model are very close to the estimation by
Hendricks (2007a).
The model-generated fraction of zero or negative wealth households is plotted in Figure 1.
We can see that introducing discount factors help the standard HIP or RIP models match this
statistics in the data.
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Figure 1: Fraction of Zero/negative Wealth Households (Age 55  Age 64)
3.3 Other statistics of wealth distribution
Since I only use one particular statistics of wealth distribution, it is informative to see how
the model performs in other statistics of wealth distribution. In Table 3, I compute the wealth
Gini for the whole population, for the retirement age people and for the coe¢cient of variance
of the retirement wealth / lifetime earnings ratio.
6 I take the estimation of  in the no bequests model of Hendricks(2007a Table 2). Since he use 5 grids for

i
and set  to be 2% or 6% lower or higher than , I set pl to the fraction of the agents with 0.94 or 0.98 
plus half of the fraction of agents with , which gives pl = 61%. I set  to be half of the di¤erence between
weighted average of the lowe s and the high s, which is 0.035. For Alan and Browning (2006), I assume a
symmetric distribution and take its coe¢cient of variance as , which is 0.087. In both cases, I recalibrate the
 to match the wealth income ratio.
10
Table 3: Other Dimensions of Wealth Distribution
Gini Retirement Gini All CVW=E Retirement
Data 0.62 0.76 1.32
RIP Benchmark 0.65 0.85 1.10
HIP Benchmark 0.52 0.80 1.17
Note: Data is from Hendriks (2007b).
CVW=E is the coe¢cient of variance of the retirement wealth/life time earning ratio.
The results show that the RIP model has the Gini coe¢cient of retirement very close to
data. The HIP model has lower Gini coe¢cients for retirement age people, but it matches the
data well in the Gini coe¢cient for the whole population. The coe¢cients of variance of both
models are lower than the data, but not much. This suggests that my choice of the target
statistics of the wealth distribution can generate a realistic wealth inequality.
4 Consumption Inequality
4.1 Empirical evidence
The empirical evidence of the age prole of consumption inequality is drawn from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) data in the U.S. by most authors. The exact estimates by di¤erent
authors di¤er because of the sample selection, the controls for time e¤ect or cohort e¤ect, and
the controls for family size. Deaton and Paxson (1994) control for the cohort e¤ect and nd
that the variance of log consumption increase by 0.25 log points from age 25 to age 65. Their
sample periods are before early 1990s. Using slightly di¤erent sample, Guvenen (2007) nd
that the life cycle consumption dispersion increases by 0.21 log points. Heathcote et al. (2005)
argue that controlling for time e¤ect and introducing longer sample periods would change the
estimation results, and therefore the recent estimation of Heathcote et al. (2010) use CEX
waves from 1980 to 2006 and control for time e¤ects. They only calculate the average age
group for ve years and only report the data until age 60, and the increase of consumption
dispersion is 0.06 log points. In another recent study with CEX waves of 1980-2003, Aguiar
and Hurst (2012) report an increase of 0.14 log points from age 25 to age 65. They control for
the cohort e¤ects and use di¤erent controls for family size.
Despite the di¤erences in the exact estimates, the consensus is: the variance of log con-
sumption increases signicantly over the life cycle and the shape is roughly non-concave. To
joint the debate of HIP vs RIP income models in a similar empirical context, I bring my model
to the data of Guvenen (2007), whose shape the standard incomplete market models fail to
match and the Bayesian learning model in Guvenen (2007) has succeeded to match. I also plot
the age prole from Deaton and Paxson (1994), which is used by Storesletten et al. (2004).
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4.2 Model Vs Data
I consider two benchmark models, one for RIP and one for HIP, where pension is included
and borrowing limit is set to the next years expected income. Age proles of consumption
inequality in both RIP and HIP benchmark models from age 25 to age 65 are shown in Figure
2. Since we are interested in the increase of consumption inequality, not its levels, I normalize
the consumption inequality for age 25 to be zero.
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Figure 2: Age Prole of Consumption Inequality: Model Vs Data
Without discount rate heterogeneity, the consumption inequality in both the RIP model
and HIP model increase over the life cycle and has a concave age prole. In RIP model, the life-
time increase of consumption inequality is higher than data; in HIP model, the lifetime increase
of consumption is less signicant and is lower than data. As Lucas (2003) and Storesletten et
al.(2004) argued, this evidence of consumption inequality favors the RIP model in which the
labour market income process is highly persistent.
With discount rate heterogeneity, the consumption inequality is tilted up, more so from age
50 on. In the RIP model, although the shape is not signicantly linear, it does make the prole
more convex in the last ten working years. There is no e¤ect of the increase of consumption
inequality in the RIP model.
In the HIP model, introducing discount rate heterogeneity makes the consumption inequal-
ity increase more. The prole with discount rate heterogeneity becomes approximately linear.
HIP model with discount heterogeneity does a good job in accounting for the consumption
inequality data, especially for Guvenens estimation. Unlike Guvenen (2007), the success of
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HIP model is not a result of gradual Bayesian learning. Therefore, the key message from this
accounting exercise is: without changing the structure of the plain-vanilla life cycle model,
adding well-estimated discount rate heterogeneity to a HIP model would not only generate
a realistic wealth distribution but also simultaneously account for the age prole of the con-
sumption dispersion, both in magnitude and in shape.
4.3 Where does the shape come from?
To single out the e¤ect of discount rate heterogeneity, I shut down all the income shocks in
the simulated model to study the pure e¤ect of discount rate heterogeneity on the age prole
of consumption dispersion. This is very close to the case of complete markets, except for
the possible binding borrowing constraints. The residual becomes the consumption dispersion
purely due to income shocks. Figure 3 and Figure 4 report the results of this decomposition.
The pure e¤ect of discount rate heterogeneity is U-shaped, which is consistent with the nding
in a complete market model (Sun 2013). It is clear that most of the increase of the consumption
inequality of the last ten working years is attributed to discount rate heterogeneity. Comparing
to the homogeneous discount models where the retirement wealth of the old agents is too
much to increase the consumption dispersion, it is exactly this property of the discount rate
heterogeneity model that resolves the excess concavity puzzle of the standard models.
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Figure 3: Decomposition of Consumption Inequality: RIP Model
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Figure 4: Decomposition of Consumption Inequality: HIP Model
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
I have shown that the benchmark HIP model with discount rate heterogeneity has done a good
job in matching the age prole of consumption inequality. Beyond the benchmark models,
I will study four di¤erent setups: excluding pension, without borrowing constraints, natural
borrowing constraints and high wealth/income ratio. For each case, I re-estimate the distrib-
ution of i, which is reported in Table 1. The age proles of consumption inequality for each
setup in RIP and HIP models are reported in Figure 5 and Figure 6, respectively.
Role of pension Figure 5 and 6 tell us that the shape of consumption inequality would
become more convex if pension were excluded. In other words, including pension mitigates
the e¤ect of discount rate heterogeneity, especially for the old agents. Without pension, the
old households are more willing to save for retirement. To match the model ratio of house-
holds holding zero or negative wealth to the data, it requires higher degree of discount rate
heterogeneity and higher fraction of relatively impatient households, as we have seen in Table
2. This drives up the consumption inequality between di¤erent household groups.
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Figure 5: Age Prole of Consumption Inequality: RIP Model
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Figure 6: Age Prole of Consumption Inequality: HIP Model
Role of wealth-income ratio Although the choice of wealth-income ratio change the
distribution of i, Figure 5 and 6 show that it gives negligible e¤ect on the age proles of
consumption inequality. This result is di¤erent from the standard models with homogeneous
discount rates, where the wealth-income ratio is important. In the models with discount rate
heterogeneity, higher wealth-income ratio has two e¤ects. Normally it increases  and thus
makes the household holding more wealth for self-insurance, which lowers the consumption
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inequality. On the other hand, when  is high,  has to be increased to match the fraction
of zero or negative wealth agents, which increases the consumption inequality. The results
show that these two e¤ects almost cancel each other out, and therefore the consumption in-
equality is not very sensitive to the choice of wealth-income ratio in the models with discount
heterogeneity.
Role of borrowing constraints As to the sensitivity of borrowing constraints, I consider
two extreme cases: no borrowing and natural borrowing constraints (NBC). In Figure 5 and 6;
we can see the e¤ect of excluding borrowing is to tilt up the consumption inequality prole and
is very close to the prole of no-pension economy for most part of the life cycle. Intuitively,
excluding borrowing has a similar e¤ect as excluding pension, which makes the households
save more and thus requires higher degree of discount rate heterogeneity to match the data.
The former is the precautionary saving motive and the latter is the life cycle saving motive.
Interestingly, the shape of proles in the no borrowing case becomes concave in the last ten
working years. It is because of the with-in group inequality of the low  households decreases
when approaching retirement. For some of the low  households, they are too impatient to
save, even when retirement is near. They are willing to borrow in the no borrowing case, which
causes the borrowing constraints of those agents to be binding. Therefore, the consumption for
the borrowing constrained households is lower than that derived from the optimal consumption
rule when the borrowing constraint is not binding. When approaching retirement, some of
the previously borrowing constrained agents become unconstrained. Since this increase of
consumption happens to the households with relatively lower consumption level, the with-in
group consumption inequality decreases.
When there are only natural borrowing constraints, in the RIP model the result does not
di¤er much from the benchmark case, because the borrowing constraints of expected next years
income would be hardly binding for any households. In the HIP model, some agents with lower
wage growth rate are more likely to hold zero or negative wealth and the borrowing constraints
in the benchmark model are more often binding. Hence, the consumption inequality prole
goes in the opposite direction as the no borrowing case. It is U-shaped, which is similar to the
previous decomposition with no idiosyncratic shocks.
The choice of borrowing constraints would not be a problem for the standard model with-
out discount rate heterogeneity, since the fact that in the model no one will be borrowing
constrained near retirement makes the borrowing constraints quantitatively less important for
consumption inequality. If there does exist discount rate heterogeneity, however, the assump-
tion about borrowing constraints is not innocuous and thus the borrowing constraint should
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be chosen carefully.
5 Initial condition Vs Life-time risk
Di¤erence quantitative models deliver di¤erent sources of life-time inequality. In models with
discount rate heterogeneity and heterogeneous income proles, there are possibly four sources of
inequality: xed e¤ect, individual income growth rate, individual discount rate and realization
of income shocks. These four di¤erent dimensions of inequality contribute in di¤erent amount
to the lifetime inequality of consumption, wealth, and welfare.
The lifetime money equivalent welfare can be dened as
M = u 1[
(1  i)E
TP
t=1
t 1i u(ci;t)
1  Ti
] (5)
Note that in the standard lifetime welfare calculation, the welfare is higher for the household
with higher , even if the consumption streams are identical. To remove this direct e¤ect, I
discount the life-time welfare by 1 i
1 T
i
. The total variance of welfare can be decomposed into
with-group and between-group variance as follows
V arM = E(V ar(M jx)) + V ar(E(M jx)) (6)
where x = ; ,  or all of these three variables. The results are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Decomposition of Life Time Welfare:
Initial Conditions Vs Shocks
Initial Conditions Income Shocks
Only a Only  Only  All
HIP heterogeneous  1% 62% 80% 96% 4%
HIP homogeneous  14% 54% - 86% 14%
RIP heterogeneous  16% - 48% 96% 4%
RIP homogeneous  40% - - 40% 60%
The contribution of xed e¤ect to the RIP model with homogeneous discount rate is 40%,
which is close to the estimate of 0.47 in Storesletten et al. (2004). When discount rate
heterogeneity is present, the xed e¤ect can only account for 16% percent of total inequality and
the total variance accounted for by initial condition is 96%, which is close to the estimate of 0.9
in Keane and Wolpin (1997) and higher than 64% in Huggett et al. (2011). In the HIP model,
the heterogeneous income prole alone can account for 62% for the lifetime inequality and
the heterogeneous discount factor alone can account for 80% of the total inequality. In short,
the initial condition becomes more important when there is ex ante heterogeneity in either
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discount rates or income proles. Among the initial conditions, the discount rate heterogeneity
is the most important, and the xed e¤ect is the least important. Generating realistic wealth
inequality, this simulated model highlights the importance of ex ante heterogeneities as main
sources of life time inequality.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I investigate the role of discount rate heterogeneity on consumption inequality
in the context of incomplete market life cycle models. The major e¤ect of the discount rate
heterogeneity is to make the consumption inequality prole more convex, especially for the
household when approaching retirement. Since in the U.S. data the age prole of consumption
inequality is non-concave and in the standard model it increases concavely, the presence of
discount rate heterogeneity brings the model closer to the data.
To generate a more realistic wealth inequality than the standard incomplete market models,
I estimate the distribution of discount rates using moments from the wealth distribution. I
nd that the model with heterogeneous income proles (HIP) and discount rate heterogeneity
can successfully account for the empirical age prole of consumption inequality, both in its
magnitude and in its non-concave shape. Di¤erent from Guvenen (2007), who resolves the
puzzle of the concave age prole of consumption inequality by introducing an unobserbable
Bayesian learning parameter, I do not use any free parameter to match the consumption data
and my model also generates a more realistic wealth inequality.
When discount rate heterogeneity is present, the borrowing constraints and pension become
more important for consumption inequality. These caveats must be noticed when studying
consumption inequality in standard models with homogeneous preferences. As to the normative
question asked by Keane and Wolpin (1997) , Storesletten et al. (2004) and Huggett et al.
(2011), the simulated model with realistic wealth inequality also highlights the importance of
ex ante heterogeneities as main sources of life time inequality.
As Browning et al. (1999) warned us, using micro data to calibrate the preference pa-
rameters in quantitative models may have potential aws and has to be taken carefully, es-
pecially when there is preference heterogeneity. This paper, among a few others, takes this
view seriously. Without changing the structure of the plain-vanilla life cycle model, adding
well-estimated discount rate heterogeneity gives us important implications for the consumption
inequality, for the nature of income processes and for the lifetime welfare.
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